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1 – Introduction
For decades, Tunisia has been considered
one of the success stories on the African
continent.  Sound  macroeconomic
alongside impressive social management
accomplishments set Tunisia apart as one
of the most robust performers in Africa. This
perception was cemented by the country’s
progress in recent years, including its brisk
recovery from the 2009 economic crisis
characterized by a GDP growth of 3.7% in
2010  and  impressive  progress  towards
achieving  the  Millennium  Development
Goals (MDGs). This led many to believe
Tunisia was, by-and-large, a sustainable
good practice development model. 
Yet on January 14, 2011 former President
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali left power after a
month of protests and violent confrontations
that left over 200 dead. The social unrest
and political turmoil  that engulfed Tunisia
in  January  indicated  that  despite  the
country’s comparative economic success,
key social and development challenges
had not been addressed. The combination
of  youth  graduate  unemployment,
conspicuous and predatory corruption 
as  well  as  political  and  economic
disenfranchisement  had  created  an
untenable condition of discontent amongst
Tunisians that erupted in a revolution and
ended the 23 year rule of the country’s
second President.
In the sections that follow, this note will
review the different factors that led to the
recent social unrests. It will then analyse the
macroeconomic environment and introduce
a series of economic scenarios for 2011
and 2012. Having assessed the various
directions the economy could take, given
the conditions described above, the note
provides a few concluding remarks. 





1 This note has been prepared by Audrey Verdier-Chouchane, Principal Research Economist (EDRE), Natsuko Obayashi, 
Principal Country-Economist for Tunisia (ORNA) and Vincent Castel, Principal Program Coordinator for Tunisia (ORNA), under
the  supervision  of  Jacob  Kolster,  Director  of  Regional  department  North  1  (ORNA)  and  of  Désiré  Vencatachellum 
and Peter Walkenhorst, respectively Director and Manager of Development research department (EDRE). The authors also
thank Paula Ximena Mejia, for her inputs and support. 
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+216 7110 20762.   Key Development Challenges Remain
after the Revolution 
Even if the social unrest ultimately took a political turn, its roots
lay in the day-to-day challenges faced by the population.
Indeed Tunisian disquiet was sparked by the suicide of a young
man  who  set  himself  on  fire  after  the  police  confiscated 
his  produce  cart.  Mohammed  Bouazizi  quickly  became  a
symbol of the economic desperation shared by a majority 
of the Tunisian people. 
Social unrest in Tunisia occurred in spite of reported social
progress. Tunisia scores well on progress towards the MDGs.
When it comes to the Human Development Indicator (HDI),
Tunisian scores are equally impressive, ranking 98 out of 182
countries. In Africa, only three countries rank higher than
Tunisia (Libya 55, Seychelles 57 and Mauritius 81). 
Yet,  despite  these  social  advantages,  the  country  faces 
high levels of youth unemployment, particularly among youth 
with  graduate  degrees,  important  regional  inequities  and
governance  problems.  These  issues,  which  triggered  the
revolution, still remain and will have to be addressed urgently
by the government.
2.1   Youth Graduate Unemployment 
Although the fight against unemployment has been the number
one priority of the Tunisian economic policy for several years,
the government failed to create adequate jobs for the
educated youth. While the overall unemployment rate has
remained above 14%, unemployment for the educated youth
increased by a factor of 10 over the last two decades and
reached 20% in 2010 (Figure 1). The upward trend in the
unemployment of university graduates is the consequence
of  the  youth  bulge,  high  throughput  in  universities,
mismatch in the demand and supply of skilled workers,
and  the  relatively  low  quality  of  training  received  by 
many graduates2. 
While there is a clear lack of employment opportunities for
the youth, it also seems that there is a mismatch between
the field of specialization chosen and the realities of the
job market. As a testimony, unemployment reached 47.1%
on average for the youth holding a Masters in Economics,
Management  or  Law  and  43.2%  for  those  holding  a
Masters in Social Science. In contrast unemployment was
24.5 % for those in the Engineering field3.
The issue of unemployment for young graduates will not 
be resolved quickly as the Tunisian labour force increases 
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2 The PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) reports from the OECD shows that the quality of secondary education in Tunisia is relatively low out of a sample of about
65 countries. OECD. 2009. PISA 2009 Results: What Students Know and Can Do. http://www.oecd.org/edu/pisa/2009
3 A complete analysis of the issue of youth unemployment can be found in Stampini, M. and A. Verdier-Chouchane (2011), “Labor Market Dynamics in Tunisia: The Issue of Youth Unem-
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Figure 1: Unemployment in Tunisia
Source: INS (National Institute of Statistics) and the World  Bank
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Figure 2 – Tunisian Unemployment Rates of Youth Graduates
by Education and Gender, 2007
Source: Stampini, M. and A. Verdier-Chouchane (2011), op. cit.in  addition  to  the  stock  of  those  already  unemployed. 
But most importantly, because of the impact of the revolution
on  production  capacity,  investors’  confidence  and  local
insecurity, economic activities are expected to decline in the
short-term, especially in the industry and tourism sectors. In
addition to the destruction of existing jobs, these conditions
could also seriously constrain employment generation in the
months to come.
One of the challenges for the government will be to generate
decent job opportunities for young unemployed graduates. In
January 2011 the interim government established a program
offering  part-time  employment  opportunities  in  the  public
sector to long-term young unemployed graduates. In this
program, workers would work half time and receive TDN 150
on a monthly basis (equivalent to 55% of the minimum wage)
and would benefit from health care coverage and preferential
public transport fares. 
2.2   Regional Disparities
Although Tunisia has experienced a significant reduction of
poverty and improvement of social indicators, regional and
socio-economic disparities remain significant. The issue
of regional disparities was at the core of the social unrest 
in the cities of Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and Thala in the 
Mid-East region.
Overall, the Eastern coast is in better shape than the Western
and  Southern  regions  (see  Figure  3).  The  population  and
economic activities are mainly concentrated in the North East
(governorate of Tunis) and the Mid-East (governorate of Sfax)
with the coastal region accounting for 75% of non-agricultural
jobs.  As  a  result,  there  is  significant  variability  in  average
consumption and in poverty across regions. In 2000, while 
the poverty headcount (national average) stood at 18.4%, it in
fact ranged from 6.9% in Greater Tunis to 30.8% in the 
Mid-West (see Figure 4). Similarly, unemployment is especially
severe in the hinterlands (see Map 1). On average, since 2004,
the unemployment rate has exceeded 22.6% in the region of
Jendouba, Le Kef, Kasserine and Gafsa.
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Map 1 – Unemployment rate across Tunisian regions
in 2004
Map 2 – Illiteracy Rate (aged 10-29) across regions
in 2004 TunisiaHowever, the poorest regions have also suffered from a lack of
attention by the authorities with the coastal areas receiving
65% of public investment. As a result, the Mid-West is the
poorest region in terms of public service delivery (health and
education) as exemplified by the number of inhabitants per
pediatrician (Figure 5) and youth illiteracy (map 2). To buy social
peace, forthcoming key challenge of the Tunisian government
will be to reduce inequality across regions.
2.3   Governance & Corruption 
In terms of governance, Tunisia occupies a relatively good
position compared with the average of countries in the Middle
East and North Africa region (MENA), and better still, compared
to the rating for sub-Saharan Africa. An exception, however, is
the indicator related to Voice & Accountability. Transparency
International ranks Tunisia 59th out of 178 countries, which
makes the country the most highly ranked state in North Africa.
However,  Freedom  House4 provides  evidence  that  Tunisia
showed a significant lack in political rights and civil liberties. 
The Freedom House indicators also suggest that Tunisia had
one of the worst media environments in the Arab world in 2010,
with  the  government  using  an  array  of  legal,  penal,  and
economic measures to silence dissenting voices. 
Most importantly perhaps, the conspicuous corruption at the
highest  level  of  decision  making  in  Tunisia  was  a  critical
element behind the popular uprising that led to the downfall of
former President Ben Ali. It allowed the development of an ill
acquired financial empire without precedent in Tunisia including
the media, transport, banking, telecommunications, tourism,
airport services and retail sectors5. Shady acquisitions
accelerated during the privatization program in early 2000, as
did the provision of banking loans at very low interest rates
which facilitated asset predation.  
The Global Financial Integrity Foundation estimated the
cost of corruption in the country at about USD 1 billion
dollar per year6.
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Figure 3: Population and Companies and across 
Tunisian regions (2000)
Source: Krifa-Schneider, H., F. Gsouma and H. Hammadou (2009) “Ouverture 

















Figure 4: Decomposition of total poverty headcount, using
per capita expenditures (in 2000 USD PPP), with a poverty
line of USD 3
Source: African Development Bank (2010) “Growth, Poverty and Inequality in Selected
African Middle Income Countries”, mimeo, Development Research Department. 
4http://www.freedomhouse.org/
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Foreign companies (%)3.  Forecasting the Impact of the Revolution
    on the Tunisian Economy
3.1   Recent Macroeconomic Trends
Although Tunisia was not hit directly by the financial crisis, the
steep recession in European countries significantly affected
significantly Tunisian export and its manufacturing sector in
2009  (around  80%  of  the  Tunisian  export  market)7.  An
economic rebound began in 2010, with a GDP growth
estimate of 3.7%, helped by the depreciation of the dinar which
boosted Tunisian industrial exports to the euro area. Inflation
rose by 4.5% in 2010 on average, due to the increase of 
the subsidised food and oil prices in order to keep the
Compensation Budget under control. 
The current account deficit increased from 2.9% in 2009 to
4.8% in 2010, due to the rebound of the trade sector in
which an increase in imports (+17.5%), outpaced exports
(+12.6%),  while  tourism  revenues  stagnated  (+1.2%).
Despite the global economic rebound, FDI inflows stagnated
(+3%) in 2010. Foreign exchange reserves still stand at a
comfortable level about 5 months of imports.
Fiscal deficit was 2.6% of GDP in 2010. The impact of the
economic crisis on fiscal revenues has been limited, because of
the offshore status of the export sector. The 2010 budget kept
a supportive fiscal stance to ensure the economic recovery with
a high level of public investment, but which has not been fully
absorbed. Public debt level remained stable (USD 20.9 billion
or about 43% of GDP in 2010), after its significant reduction
from 58.3% of GDP in 2005, due to the appreciation of the
USD and the Yen against the Dinar. For the same reason, the
external debt in 2010 is expected to be at the same level as
2009, namely 48% of GDP (or about USD 23.3 billion).
The banking sector reform resulted in a reduction of the NPL
(non performing loan) ratio from 25% in 2003 to 13% in 2009,
while provisioning rate for NPL increased from 44% to 58%
and the capital adequacy ratio rose from 9.3% to 12.4% during
the same period. 
3.2   Economic Forecast for the short term
The Revolution holds great promise for Tunisia and the longer-
term dividends could well be significant in terms of economic
growth and social equity and cohesion. However, the country’s
political  situation  remains  fragile.  In  addition  to  political
transition challenges, in the short term, the government is
facing the immediate urgency caused by a reduced fiscal
space and increasing social demands while challenges related
to youth unemployment, regional disparities and economic
disenfranchisement cannot be left unaddressed. 
The authorities estimated that during the recent upheavals
between USD 5 and 8 billion (around 4% of GDP) were lost,
tourism receipts have been seriously affected, key investments
have been put on hold and thousands of jobs have been lost.
During  the  month  of  January  2011,  TND  1.8  billion  was
injected  into  the  banking  sector  to  contain  a  massive
withdrawal.  This  contrasts  withthe  over-liquidity  situation
Tunisia had faced, recently, leading to a mop-up of TND 1.1
billion last year. Foreign exchange reserves fell from TND 13
billion (147 days of import) end-December 2010 to TND 12.2
billion (139 days) in January 2011.
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Figure 4: Number of inhabitants per pediatrician 
in 2004 (‘000)
Source: Ministry of Public HealthThe  African  Economic  Outlook  model  has  been  used  to
forecast macroeconomic impacts in the short-term, based on
three scenarios: namely High, Middle and Low . Table 1 shows
the summary results based on the three scenarios while the full
tables of demand composition, public finances and current
account are presented in Annexes 1, 2 and 3. 
In the three scenarios, the GDP growth will be affected by a
lower demand for tourism services, business disruption, and
reduced FDI. The middle scenario suggests a GDP growth rate
of 1.1% for 2011, followed by a slight economic recovery at
3.3% in 2012. Private investment will contract, while current
public expenditures, especially wages and salaries, will rise
significantly because of the increasing social demands. The
fiscal deficit will stand at 5.2% of GDP in 2011. Current
account deficit will increase to 7.6% of GDP, because of an
increase in imports and decrease in tourism receipts. Similarly,
inflation could grow to at least 4.7%.
GDP growth rate could increase to 3.6% in 2011 followed by
a quick recovery at 4.2% in 2012, in case of rapid normalisation
of the economy and quick recovery in the tourism sector,
supported  by  a  strong  external  financing  and  FDI  and  a 
well-targeted fiscal stimulus package. Fiscal deficit will remain
under control at 3.9% of GDP, but the current account deficit
will reach 6.1% of GDP, because of increased deficit in the
trade balance, with export of manufactured goods inducing
increase in imports, and decrease in tourism receipts. Inflation
will be under control at 4.2%, although high international food
and oil prices will put pressure on the fiscal balance and the
current account.
Nevertheless, in case of prolonged political and social
instability, the economy could contract by 2.5% in 2011.
Both public and private investment will contract, while
massive hiring and salary increase in the public sector will 
affect the fiscal deficit, which could reach 6% of GDP. The
Government will, in this case, try to cope only with social
demands, at the expense of the fiscal balance, external balance
and inflationary pressure. The current account deficit will
increase to 8.9% because of the significant loss in tourism
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Table 1: Summary Results of High, Middle and Low Scenarios
Macroeconomic Indicators
2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Low Mid High Low Mid High
Real GDP growth 3.0 3.7 -2.5 1.1 3.6 2.4 3.3 4.2
CPI inflation 3.5 4.4 6.4 4.7 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.2
Budget balance % GDP -2.7 -2.6 -6.0 -5.2 -3.9 -5.9 -4.8 -3.2
Current account % GDP -2.8 -4.7 -8.9 -7.6 -6.1 -7.0 -5.6 -4.4
Note: Main assumptions for the different scenarios are reported in the Tables on Demand Composition (columns 4 and 5) of Annexes 2, 3 and 4. Another important assumption
concerns the tourism receipts respectively of -5%, -20% and -30% for the high, mid and low scenario.
Source : projection of EDRE-ORNA A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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receipts and the increase in imports induced by an increase in
consumption and a decrease in exports. Inflation could reach 
at least 6.4% because of the salary increase, depreciation, 
and high international food and oil prices which will be passed
through to domestic prices despite the high level of subsidies.
For  the  low  scenario  a  slow  positive  growth  of  2.4%  is
projected for 2012.
4.   Concluding Remarks
Developments  in  Tunisia  during  the  first  months  of  2011
unfolded with unprecedented speed, defying predictions of
even the most insightful observers of this, the smallest and—
until recent events—arguably the most stable and economically
well-performing country in the North Africa region. What started
out  in  mid-December,  with  protests  in  the  capital  of  the 
Tunisian centre Governorate of Sidi Bouzid, after a young and
unemployed  graduate  student  set  himself  on  fire,  spread
throughout the country in the following weeks and culminated
in the departure of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. 
Following initial spikes in looting and insecurity, the ensuing
months have seen Tunisia move towards relative social calm
and  emerging  optimism  about  the  future.  After  several
iterations, an interim government, headed by an experienced
politician,  Mr.  Béji  Caïd  Essebsi,  as  Prime  Minister,  and
composed of technocratic ministers, was finally formed (in early
March). This team seems to enjoy a significant measure 
of credibility. 
The most recent interim government, but also its immediate
predecessor, has undertaken gradual but decisive actions 
to purge the top-brass of the former regime in the security 
forces as well as the central and regional administrations. 
In a country-wide survey carried out by Tunisian SIGMA in early
February, two-thirds of those surveyed expressed trust in the
administration and the transitional government
8.
The first two months following the departure of Ben Ali thus
give  reason  for  guarded  optimism  and  the  longer  term
dividends of the revolution could well be significant—both in
terms of economic growth and social equity and cohesion.
Provided  the  course  stuck  out  these  first  months  of  the
Revolution is pursued and leads to free and orderly elections,
Tunisia’s economic growth potential is likely to gain significantly
as  the  drag  of  predatory  corruption  is  lifted  and  a 
socio-political  environment  more  conducive  to  individual 
liberty and private economic enterprise takes hold. 
Nevertheless, serious challenges remain in the months ahead
before the full potential presented by the Tunisian Revolution
can  be  realized.  Besides  the  political  and  security-related
challenges that need to be navigated as the country moves
towards  parliamentary  and  presidential  elections,  the  real
economy and fiscal balances will be under pressure as a result
of the drop in economic activity that surrounded and followed
in the wake of the Revolution. Moreover, the underlying social
discontentment that drove the Tunisian Revolution—notably
youth unemployment, particularly among young graduates,
and regional disenfranchisement—remain. 
There is thus little doubt that political stability and social peace—
indeed, the very credibility of the interim government—hinges
critically on early and decisive progress on these fronts. Concerted
and  significant  early  support  from  external  development 
partners such as the AfDB, the World Bank, the EU and others
constitutes a critically important element in bridging Tunisia’s
short term challenges to the longer term opportunities.
8 SIGMA Conseilis, a Tunisian marketing and media-study firm (with operations in Algeria, Morocco, Libya, France, and Tunisia), carried out the survey of 1,250 individuals (18 years
or older) in Tunisia during the period January 30th to February 3th, 2011.Macroeconomic
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Table 4 - Macroeconomic Indicators
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Real GDP growth 3,0 3,7 -2,5 2,4
CPI inflation 3,5 4,4 6,4 4,4
Budget balance % GDP -2,7 -2,6 -6,0 -5,9
Current account % GDP -2,8 -4,7 -8,9 -7,0
Annex 1. Detailed Results for the Low Scenario
Percentage of GDP
(current price) Percentage changes, volume Contribution to real GDP
growth
2002 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p) 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Total revenue and grants
Tax revenue
Grants
23,8 24,8 12,0 -17,6 2,7 2,7 -4,3 0,6
4,8 4,9 12,0 -8,0 5,0 0,5 -0,4 0,2




80,0 78,1 4,5 2,9 2,0 3,6 2,3 1,7
17,2 16,2 4,5 12,4 1,3 0,8 2,1 0,3




-3,8 -2,9 - - - -2,6 -0,4 0,2
40,8 45,0 2,6 -7,2 3,5 1,0 -2,7 1,2
-44,6 -48,0 8,9 -5,3 2,6 -3,5 2,2 -1,1
Real GDP growth rate 3,7 -2,5 2,4
Table 1 - Demand Composition
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
Table 2 - Public Finances (percentage of GDP)
Table 3 - Current Account (percentage of GDP)
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
2002 2007 2008 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)




23,3 21,9 24,2 23,1 23,1 23,3 23,1
19,5 19,1 20,5 19,9 20,1 20,2 20,0
0,4 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2
3,4 2,7 3,3 2,9 2,9 2,9 2,9







25,6 24,5 24,8 25,8 25,7 29,3 29,0
18,0 18,4 19,0 18,1 18,4 22,2 21,8
15,2 16,0 16,9 16,1 16,4 20,2 20,0
11,2 10,6 10,4 10,7 10,7 12,3 12,3
1,5 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,9 2,6 2,5
2,8 2,4 2,1 2,0 1,9 2,0 1,8
7,3 5,4 5,8 6,6 7,2 6,9 7,1
Primary balance 0,5 -0,2 1,4 -0,7 -0,7 -4,0 -4,1
Overall balance -2,3 -2,6 -0,7 -2,7 -2,6 -6,0 -5,9
2002 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p) 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Trade balance
Exports of goods (f.o.b.)
Imports of goods (f.o.b.)
-9,2 -7,4 -8,9 -8,5 -10,9 -12,7 -12,1
29,6 38,9 42,7 33,1 33,7 32,9 33,0
38,8 46,3 51,7 41,6 44,6 45,6 45,0
Services 5,3 5,4 5,9 5,8 6,3 3,7 5,0
Factor income 0,3 -0,8 -1,2 -0,7 -0,6 -0,7 -0,7
Current transfers 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,7
Current account balance -3,2 -2,4 -3,8 -2,8 -4,7 -8,9 -7,0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Real GDP growth 1,8 5,6 6,0 4,1 5,4 6,3 4,6 3,0 3,7 -2,5 2,4
CPI inflation 2,7 2,8 3,6 2,1 4,5 3,1 5,1 3,5 4,4 6,4 4,4
GDP (scaled $) 32901,4 34728,2 36826,1 38329,9 40380,6 42942,5 44924,9 46295,0 47981,1 46817,7 47929,9
RGDP 23141,8 27453,9 31183,9 32272,3 34376,8 38922,9 44878,5 43523,0 45800,0 45382,2 47800,4
Exchange rate 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,5
Table 5 - Summary Results
a. Only major items are reported.
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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Table 4 - Macroeconomic Indicators
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Real GDP growth 3,0 3,7 1,1 3,3
CPI inflation 3,5 4,4 4,7 4,6
Budget balance % GDP -2,7 -2,6 -5,2 -4,8
Current account % GDP -2,8 -4,7 -7,6 -5,6
Annex 2 - Detailed Results for the Middle Scenario
Percentage of GDP
(current price) Percentage changes, volume Contribution to real GDP
growth
2002 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p) 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Total revenue and grants
Tax revenue
Grants
23,8 24,8 12,0 -8,0 4,0 2,7 -2,0 0,9
4,8 4,9 12,0 0,0 2,0 0,5 0,0 0,1




80,0 78,1 4,5 5,2 2,8 3,6 4,1 2,4
17,2 16,2 4,5 13,8 1,7 0,8 2,3 0,3




-3,8 -2,9 - - - -2,6 -1,1 0,1
40,8 45,0 2,6 -3,6 4,8 1,0 -1,3 1,7
-44,6 -48,0 8,9 -0,6 3,9 -3,5 0,2 -1,6
Real GDP growth rate 3,7 1,1 3,3
Table 1 - Demand Composition
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
Table 2 - Public Finances (percentage of GDP)
Table 3 - Current Account (percentage of GDP)
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
2002 2007 2008 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)




23,3 21,9 24,2 23,1 23,1 23,3 23,1
19,5 19,1 20,5 19,9 20,1 20,2 20,0
0,4 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2
3,4 2,7 3,3 2,9 2,9 2,9 2,9







25,6 24,5 24,8 25,8 25,7 28,5 27,9
18,0 18,4 19,0 18,1 18,4 21,0 20,6
15,2 16,0 16,9 16,1 16,4 19,1 18,9
11,2 10,6 10,4 10,7 10,7 12,1 12,0
1,5 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,9 2,3 2,3
2,8 2,4 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,7
7,3 5,4 5,8 6,6 7,2 7,3 7,1
Primary balance 0,5 -0,2 1,4 -0,7 -0,7 -3,3 -3,0
Overall balance -2,3 -2,6 -0,7 -2,7 -2,6 -5,2 -4,8
2002 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p) 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Trade balance
Exports of goods (f.o.b.)
Imports of goods (f.o.b.)
-9,2 -7,4 -8,9 -8,5 -10,9 -12,4 -11,6
29,6 38,9 42,7 33,1 33,7 33,4 33,6
38,8 46,3 51,7 41,6 44,6 45,8 45,3
Services 5,3 5,4 5,9 5,8 6,3 4,8 6,1
Factor income 0,3 -0,8 -1,2 -0,7 -0,6 -0,6 -0,6
Current transfers 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,6
Current account balance -3,2 -2,4 -3,8 -2,8 -4,7 -7,6 -5,6
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Real GDP growth 1,8 5,6 6,0 4,1 5,4 -6,3 4,6 3,0 3,7 1,1 3,3
CPI inflation 2,7 2,8 3,6 2,1 4,5 3,1 5,1 3,5 4,4 4,7 4,6
GDP (scaled $) 32901,4 34728,2 36826,1 38329,9 40380,6 42942,5 44924,9 46295,0 47981,1 48484,4 50073,7
RGDP 23141,8 27453,9 31183,9 32272,3 34376,8 38922,9 44878,5 43523,0 45800,0 47340,1 50474,3
Exchange rate 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,5
Table 5 - Summary Results
a. Only major items are reported.
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
11
E c o n o m i c   B r i e f
1 1 M a r c h   2 0 1 1   •   w w w . a f d b . o r g
AfDB
Table 4 - Macroeconomic Indicators
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Real GDP growth 3,0 3,7 3,6 4,2
CPI inflation 3,5 4,4 4,2 4,2
Budget balance % GDP -2,7 -2,6 -3,9 -3,2
Current account % GDP -2,8 -4,7 -6,1 -4,4
Annex 3 - Detailed Results for the High Scenario
Percentage of GDP
(current price) Percentage changes, volume Contribution to real GDP
growth
2002 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p) 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Total revenue and grants
Tax revenue
Grants
23,8 24,8 12,0 0,6 5,2 2,7 0,1 1,2
4,8 4,9 12,0 3,0 2,0 0,5 0,1 0,1




80,0 78,1 4,5 5,3 3,6 3,6 4,3 2,9
17,2 16,2 4,5 10,6 1,7 0,8 1,8 0,3




-3,8 -2,9 - -2,6 -0,8 0,0
40,8 45,0 2,6 1,1 5,9 1,0 0,4 2,1
-44,6 -48,0 8,9 2,8 5,1 -3,5 -1,2 -2,1
Real GDP growth rate 3,7 3,6 4,2
Table 1 - Demand Composition
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
Table 2 - Public Finances (percentage of GDP)
Table 3 - Current Account (percentage of GDP)
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.
2002 2007 2008 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)




23,3 21,9 24,2 23,1 23,1 23,3 23,1
19,5 19,1 20,5 19,9 20,1 20,1 20,0
0,4 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2
3,4 2,7 3,3 2,9 2,9 2,9 2,9







25,6 24,5 24,8 25,8 25,7 27,1 26,4
18,0 18,4 19,0 18,1 18,4 19,7 19,1
15,2 16,0 16,9 16,1 16,4 17,8 17,5
11,2 10,6 10,4 10,7 10,7 11,3 11,1
1,5 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,9 2,2 2,2
2,8 2,4 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,7
7,3 5,4 5,8 6,6 7,2 7,3 7,1
Primary balance 0,5 -0,2 1,4 -0,7 -0,7 -2,0 -1,6
Overall balance -2,3 -2,6 -0,7 -2,7 -2,6 -3,9 -3,2
2002 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p) 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Trade balance
Exports of goods (f.o.b.)
Imports of goods (f.o.b.)
-9,2 -7,4 -8,9 -8,5 -10,9 -11,6 -10,7
29,6 38,9 42,7 33,1 33,7 34,2 34,8
38,8 46,3 51,7 41,6 44,6 45,9 45,5
Services 5,3 5,4 5,9 5,8 6,3 5,5 6,3
Factor income 0,3 -0,8 -1,2 -0,7 -0,6 -0,6 -0,6
Current transfers 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,6
Current account balance -3,2 -2,4 -3,8 -2,8 -4,7 -6,1 -4,4
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(e) 2011(p) 2012(p)
Real GDP growth 1,8 5,6 6,0 4,1 5,4 6,3 4,6 3,0 3,7 3,6 4,2
CPI inflation 2,7 2,8 3,6 2,1 4,5 3,1 5,1 3,5 4,4 4,2 4,2
GDP (scaled $) 32901,4 34728,2 36826,1 38329,9 40380,6 42942,5 44924,9 46295,0 47981,1 49693,3 51723,7
RGDP 23141,8 27453,9 31183,9 32272,3 34376,8 38922,9 44878,5 43523,0 45800,0 48851,6 52459,8
Exchange rate 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,5
Table 5 - Summary Results
a. Only major items are reported.
Source: Data from AfDB; estimates (e) and prediction (p) based on authors' calculations.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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